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Abstract.	This	paper	argues	that	the	controversy	over	GM	crops	is	not	best	understood	in	terms	
of	the	supposed	bias,	dishonesty,	irrationality,	or	ignorance	on	the	part	of	proponents	or	critics,	
but	rather	in	terms	of	differences	in	values.	To	do	this,	the	paper	draws	upon	and	extends	
recent	work	of	the	role	of	values	and	interests	in	science,	focusing	particularly	on	inductive	risk	
and	epistemic	risk,	and	it	shows	how	the	GMO	debate	can	help	to	further	our	understanding	of	
the	various	epistemic	risks	that	are	present	in	science	and	how	these	risks	might	be	managed.	
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1.	Introduction.	The	controversy	over	genetically	modified	organisms	(GMOs)	is	intense	and	
highly	polarized.1	While	the	numerous	polls	of	public	attitudes	show	consistently	that	there	is	
significant	disagreement	over	the	risks	and	benefits	of	GM	crops	(e.g.,	Pew	Research	Center	
2016),	they	do	not	evince	just	how	polarized	the	debate	has	become.	Perhaps	more	helpful	in	
illustrating	the	depth	of	the	disagreement	is	the	following:	while	some	critics	of	GM	crops	feel	
strongly	enough	to	organize	or	march	in	worldwide	March	Against	Monsanto	protests	or	even	
to	destroy	field	trials	(as	Philippine	activists	did	in	20132),	some	proponents	of	GM	crops	feel	
sufficiently	passionate	to	accuse	those	same	critics	of	crimes	against	humanity—simply	for	
criticizing	the	technology.	In	a	well-publicized	letter	in	support	of	GM	crops,	123	Nobel	
Laureates	characterize	those	who	oppose	GMOs	not	merely	as	misguided	or	incorrect,	but	as	
irrational	and	immoral,	concluding	their	letter	as	follows:	“Opposition	based	on	emotion	and	
dogma	contradicted	by	data	must	be	stopped.	How	many	poor	people	in	the	world	must	die	
before	we	consider	this	a	crime	against	humanity?”	(emphasis	in	original).3	The	claim	that	
critics	are	acting	reprehensibly	simply	by	criticizing	GMOs	is	not	uncommon;	to	take	one	other	
prominent	example,	Norman	Borlaug—the	Nobel	Peace	Prize	winner	and	so-called	“father	of	
the	Green	Revolution”—castigates	critics	for	their	“antiscience	zealotry”	and	suggests	that	they	
are	responsible	for	the	world	hunger	that	could	have	been	prevented	by	these	purportedly	life-
saving	technologies,	had	their	development	and/or	dissemination	not	been	impeded	by	
irresponsible	attacks	(Borlaug	2000).		
Both	sides	in	the	controversy	over	GM	crops	often	dismiss	the	other	as	ignorant,	biased,	
irrational,	or	dishonest.	Critics	of	GMOs	often	dismiss	the	arguments	of	proponents	due	to	their	
supposed	biases—in	particular,	pro-industry	bias	due	to	financial	ties	to	seed	companies	or	
other	financially-interested	entities4.	Proponents	often	dismiss	the	views	of	critics	because	of	
their	supposed	ignorance,	irrationality,	or	“anti-scientific”	views.	The	“anti-science”	or	“war	on	
science”	narrative	has	become	especially	popular	among	science	journalists.	For	example,	in	his	
essay	“The	Liberals’	War	on	Science,”	Michael	Shermer	cites	the	GMO	debate	as	evidence	that	
the	political	left	is	just	as	anti-science	as	the	political	right	(Shermer	2013).	In	a	response	to	
Shermer,	Chris	Mooney	denies	that	liberals	are	just	as	anti-science	as	conservatives	by	arguing	
that	anti-GMO	views	are	not	restricted	to	the	political	left,	but	he	maintains	the	assumption	
that	most	critics	of	GMOs	are	anti-science	(Mooney	2014).5	Even	some	philosophers	of	science	
tend	to	slide	into	an	anti-science	narrative.	For	example,	in	his	discussion	of	the	GMO	debate	in	
Science	in	a	Democratic	Society,	Philip	Kitcher	suggests	that	those	who	are	skeptical	of	the	
                                                
1	By	‘GMOs,’	I	mean	organisms	created	through	the	use	of	recombinant	DNA	technologies.		
2	See,	for	example,	Kupferschmidt	(2013).	
3	http://supportprecisionagriculture.org/nobel-laureate-gmo-letter_rjr.html.	Accessed	July	30,	
2016.	
4	This	is	a	common	criticism	put	forward	by	March	Against	Monsanto	(http://www.march-
against-monsanto.com).	Accessed	March	28,	2017.			
5	Mooney	draws	on	work	by	Lewandowsky	et	al.	(2013)	to	argue	that	conservatives	are	just	as	
likely	to	be	skeptical	of	GMOs	as	are	liberals.	To	be	fair,	Mooney	is	less	dogmatic	in	his	
treatment	of	GMO	critics	than	is	Shermer,	but	he	still	suggests	that	those	who	question	the	
safety	of	GMOs	are	anti-science.		
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safety	of	GM	crops	are,	at	the	very	least,	ignorant	of	the	relevant	science—though	he	does	
acknowledge	that	there	might	be	legitimate	reasons	to	worry	about	the	socio-economic	
impacts	of	GM	crops	(Kitcher	2011,	Ch.	9).	
While	there	is	no	question	that	some	opponents	of	GMOs	are	biased	or	ignorant	of	the	
relevant	facts,	the	blanket	tendency	to	characterize	critics	as	anti-science	or	engaged	in	a	war	
on	science	is	both	misguided	and	dangerous.	It	is	misguided	because,	as	I	will	argue	in	this	
paper,	the	controversy	over	GM	crops	is	not	best	understood	in	terms	of	the	supposed	bias,	
dishonesty,	irrationality,	or	ignorance	on	the	part	of	proponents	or	critics,	but	rather	in	terms	of	
differences	in	values.	Decisions	to	research,	develop,	and	disseminate	particular	agriculture	
technologies	have	important	social,	economic,	and	cultural	consequences	for	a	wide	range	of	
stakeholders,	and	if	we	are	to	make	progress	in	the	debate	over	GM	crops,	it	is	essential	that	
thoughtful	communication	about	the	impacts	of	values	and	interests	on	these	decisions	be	
promoted.	Unfortunately,	anti-science	or	war-on-science	narratives	do	exactly	the	opposite.6		
The	aim	of	this	paper	is	to	argue	that	much	of	the	controversy	over	GM	crops	should	be	
understood	in	terms	of	differences	in	values—or,	more	specifically,	in	terms	of	differences	in	
how	associated	epistemic	risks	are	managed,	including	what	I	will	call	“framing	risks”	and	
“power	risks.”	I	begin	(in	Section	2)	by	reviewing	relevant	literature	on	the	role	of	values	and	
interests	in	science,	focusing	particularly	on	epistemic	risk	(Biddle	2016;	Biddle	and	Kukla	2017).	
This	work	builds	on	recent	literature	on	inductive	risk	by	arguing	that	there	are	numerous	
decisions	and	activities	in	science	that	presuppose	value	judgments;	some	of	these	are	
adequately	characterized	as	inductive	risks,	but	many	are	not.	Following	this,	I	examine	two	
points	of	contention	in	the	GMO	debate—how	the	GMO	problem	should	be	framed	(Section	3)	
and	whether	there	are	significant	health	and	safety	risks	of	some	GMOs	(Section	4)—and	argue	
that,	in	both	of	these	cases,	there	are	important	epistemic	risks	(framing	risks	and	power	risks,	
respectively)	that	are	managed	in	light	of	values	and	interests.	These	sections	aim	both	to	
improve	our	understanding	of	the	GMO	controversy	and	to	advance	our	understanding	of	the	
role	of	values	and	interests	in	science.	I	conclude	the	paper	with	some	reflections	on	different	
types	of	disagreement,	including	“deep	disagreement”	and	what	I	call	“dirty	disagreement.”		
Before	proceeding,	the	argument	should	be	qualified	in	three	ways.	First,	the	aim	of	this	
paper	is	not	to	defend	a	for	or	against	position	with	respect	to	GM	crops.	GM	crops—including	
herbicide	tolerant	crops,	pesticide	producing	crops,	and	crops	that	are	modified	to	enhance	
nutritional	content	(such	as	“Golden	Rice”)—are	very	different	from	one	another,	and	there	are	
good	reasons	to	believe	that	any	attempt	to	evaluate	all	such	crops	as	a	class	is	doomed	to	fail.	
Individual	agricultural	technologies	should	be	evaluated	on	the	basis	of	their	consequences	for	
health,	environment,	and	society—whether	they	are	GM	or	not	(Biddle	2017;	NASEM	2016;	
NRC	2002;	Nuffield	Council	on	Bioethics	1999,	2003).	Rather	than	defending	a	pro	or	con	
                                                
6	A	number	of	other	commentators	have	developed	similar	arguments.	Millstein	(2015)	argues	
for	a	similar	conclusion	with	regard	to	GM	crops,	though	her	argument	proceeds	along	different	
lines.	Goldenberg	(2016)	and	Navin	(2016)	develop	similar	arguments	in	the	context	of	vaccine	
research.	What	is	distinctive	about	the	argument	of	the	present	paper	is	the	way	in	which	it	
both	draws	on	and	extends	recent	work	in	science	and	values,	particularly	on	inductive	and	
epistemic	risk.		
 3 
position,	the	paper	aims	to	deepen	our	understanding	of	the	disagreement	and	do	so	in	a	way	
that	will	hopefully	open	up	spaces	for	improved	communication	and	mutual	understanding.		
Second,	in	arguing	that	the	controversy	over	GM	crops	is	not	best	understood	in	terms	
of	bias,	dishonesty,	irrationality,	or	ignorance,	I	am	(of	course)	not	arguing	that	all	participants	
in	the	debate	always	act	rationally.	Every	debate	includes	participants	who	do	not	always	
exhibit	canons	of	rationality	and	who	argue	for	conclusions	that	are	not	based	on	evidence;	this	
is	especially	true	in	the	GM	debate,	where	emotions	run	high	and	arguments	are	heated.	In	
arguing	that	the	controversy	is	best	understood	in	terms	of	differences	in	values,	I	am	arguing	
that	the	debate	includes	much	space	for	rational	disagreement—that	the	evidence	alone	might	
not	settle	the	question	of	whether	one	should	be	supportive	or	critical	of	a	particular	GM	crop,	
or	even	how	we	should	characterize	the	risks	of	that	crop—and	that	in	many	cases	the	
disagreements	between	participants	are	based	on	differences	in	values.	These	value	differences	
influence	not	just	which	questions	participants	take	to	be	important	(for	example,	human	
health	versus	socio-economic	impacts)	but	also	the	criteria	according	to	which	these	questions	
are	answered.	Thus,	for	example,	values	affect	how	participants	define	what	“safety”	means	
and	what	sorts	of	evidence	are	sufficient	to	determine	whether	a	technology	is	sufficiently	safe.		
Finally,	in	this	paper	I	will	restrict	my	examination	to	questions	about	the	risks	of	GM	
crops—including	risks	to	human	health	and	environment	and	socio-economic	risks.	There	is,	of	
course,	a	vigorous	debate	over	the	policy	question	of	whether	or	not	GMOs	should	be	labeled	
as	such,	but	I	will	ignore	this	issue	here,	focusing	instead	on	scientific	questions	of	risk	
assessment.		
	
2.	Values	in	Science.	It	is	uncontroversial	that	science	is	a	value-laden	activity.	Not	only	do	
value	judgments	legitimately	influence	which	research	projects	are	investigated,	how	
experiments	are	conducted,	and	how	research	results	are	applied,	they	also	legitimately	
influence	hypothesis	appraisal.	This	much	has	been	clear	at	least	since	Thomas	Kuhn’s	attempt	
to	articulate	the	“shared	criteria”	of	theory	assessment,	which	he	identifies	as	accuracy,	
consistency	(internal	and	external),	scope,	simplicity,	and	fruitfulness.	These	criteria,	he	argues,	
function	not	as	rules	but	rather	as	norms	or	values	(Kuhn	1977,	330).	In	particular,	they	can	be	
interpreted	in	different	ways,	and	they	can	be	weighted	differently	with	respect	to	one	
another.	Scientists	may	(for	example)	legitimately	interpret	the	criteria	of	simplicity	and	even	
accuracy	in	different	ways;	moreover,	scientists	often	prioritize	these	criteria	differently,	some	
(for	example)	valuing	simplicity	or	mathematical	elegance	very	highly,	others	valuing	accuracy	
more	highly.7	How	scientists	interpret	and	weigh	these	criteria	is	itself	reflective	of	values.	The	
upshot	of	this	is	that	scientists	can	rationally	disagree	with	one	another	in	their	assessment	of	
                                                
7	Philosophers	differ	on	the	question	of	whether	Kuhn’s	list	of	values	(or	something	similar	to	it)	
is,	in	fact,	the	shared	criteria	of	theory	assessment;	Ernan	McMullin	(1983)	articulates	a	list	that	
is	similar	to	Kuhn’s,	while	Helen	Longino	(1996)	defends	a	very	different	list.	I	doubt	very	much	
that	there	is	a	single	correct	list,	though	I	will	not	argue	for	this	claim	here.	What	is	relevant	is	
that,	whatever	the	criteria	are,	they	function	as	values	in	the	sense	that	they	can	be	interpreted	
differently	and	weighted	differently	with	respect	to	one	another.	
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theories	by	adopting	different	interpretations	of,	or	weighting	schemes	for,	criteria	for	theory	
evaluation.		
	 Most	philosophers	of	science	who	examine	the	roles	of	values	and	interests	in	science	
go	much	further	than	this,	arguing	that	science	is	not	only	value-laden	in	the	sense	described	
above,	but	that	values	of	a	broader	sort—including	social	and	ethical	values—also	legitimately	
influence	hypothesis	appraisal.	While	many	different	arguments	for	this	view	have	been	
given—including	arguments	from	underdetermination	(e.g.,	Biddle	2013a;	Howard	2006;	
Kourany	2003;	Longino	1990,	2002),	and	concept	formation	(e.g.,	Biddle	2016,	Dupré	2007,	
Elliott	2011;	Ludwig	2016)—one	of	the	most	discussed	of	late	is	the	argument	from	inductive	
risk	(e.g.,	Churchman	1948;	Douglas	2000;	Elliott	2011;	Elliott	and	Richards	2017;	Hempel	1965;	
John	2015;	Rudner	1953;	Wilholt	2009,	2013).	According	to	the	classical	conception,	inductive	
risk	is	understood	as	the	risk	of	wrongly	accepting	(or	rejecting)	a	hypothesis	on	the	basis	of	
evidence	(Churchman	1948,	Hempel	1965,	Rudner	1953).	Hypothesis	acceptance	(or	rejection)	
presupposes	ethical	value	judgments,	because	there	is	always	some	possibility	of	being	wrong	
(i.e.,	of	accepting	a	false	hypothesis	or	rejecting	a	true	hypothesis),	and	being	wrong	brings	
different	consequences	(including	moral	consequences)	for	different	parties.	Consider,	for	
example,	hypothesis	H,	which	states	that	exposure	to	dosage	D	of	pesticide	P	increases	the	risk	
of	cancer	in	human	beings.	Wrongly	accepting	H	will	have	consequences	for	many	stakeholders,	
but	those	consequences	will	be	particularly	significant	to	industries	that	profit	from	the	sale	of	
P.	Alternatively,	rejecting	H	if	H	is	true	will	also	have	consequences	for	many	stakeholders,	but	
those	consequences	will	be	particularly	significant	to	individuals	who	are	exposed	to	P	at	D	
(e.g.,	agricultural	laborers).	In	determining	how	much	evidence	is	enough	to	accept	(or	reject)	
H,	scientists	presuppose	value	judgments	about	the	various	possible	consequences	of	being	
wrong.	In	this	way,	the	acceptance	(or	rejection)	of	hypotheses	on	the	basis	of	statistical	
evidence	presupposes	ethical	value	judgments.8	
Beginning	with	Douglas	(2000),	a	number	of	recent	scholars	have	expanded	the	concept	
of	inductive	risk	far	beyond	how	it	was	employed	by	Churchman,	Hempel,	and	Rudner.	On	this	
expanded	account,	inductive	risk	is	not	merely	the	risk	involved	in	accepting	or	rejecting	a	
hypothesis	on	the	basis	of	evidence;	rather,	there	is	inductive	risk	“throughout	the	scientific	
process”	(Douglas	2000,	563).	There	are,	however,	significant	problems	with	this	expansion	of	
the	concept	of	inductive	risk	(Biddle	2016;	Biddle	and	Kukla	2017).9	There	are	a	variety	of	
epistemic	risks—or	risks	of	error—throughout	the	scientific	process,	but	these	epistemic	risks	
can	be	very	different	from	one	another,	and	the	strategies	for	managing	these	risks	can	be	
variegated	as	well.	Inductive	risk	is	one	type	of	epistemic	risk,	but	there	are	many	others,	and	
theories	of	the	role	of	values	and	interests	in	science	should	account	for	this.	For	example,	a	
toxicology	study	might	employ	an	inappropriate	model	organism—one	that	obscures	rather	
                                                
8	In	this	paper,	I	assume	that	considerations	of	inductive	risk	are	sufficient	to	show	that	the	
ideal	of	value	free	science	is	unattainable.	See	Wilholt	(2009)	for	an	especially	forceful	
presentation	of	the	argument.	
9	As	I	understand	it,	the	main	point	for	which	Douglas	(2000)	argues	is	that	values	operate	
throughout	the	scientific	process.	On	this	point,	I	agree	with	her.	Where	I	disagree	is	with	the	
claim	that	there	is	inductive	risk	throughout	the	scientific	process.		
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than	illuminates	the	effects	that	a	substance	might	have	on	human	beings,	thereby	raising	the	
probability	of	a	particular	type	of	error	(e.g.,	Wilholt	2009).	Or	a	medical	community	might	
adopt	overly	broad	diagnostic	criteria	for	a	disease,	which	impedes	the	development	of	
treatments	for	that	disease	(e.g.,	Biddle	2016;	Biddle	and	Kukla	2017;	Kukla	2017).	Neither	of	
these	risks	is	best	thought	of	as	inductive	risk;	neither	is	a	mistake	made	in	inferring	a	
hypothesis	from	statistical	evidence.	In	the	former	case,	the	mistake	is	the	choice	of	a	particular	
model	organism,	which	ultimately	affects	the	data	itself,	as	different	model-organism	choices	
will	yield	different	data	sets.	In	the	latter	case,	the	mistake	is	in	the	conceptualization	and	
operationalization	of	the	disease,	which	affects	any	investigation	that	employs	that	disease	
concept	(e.g.,	an	investigation	of	potential	treatments	for	the	disease).	Both,	however,	are	
important	epistemic	risks,	and	both	must	be	managed	in	light	of	the	values	and	interests.	An	
important	topic	in	research	on	science	and	values	is	to	investigate	more	fully	the	various	types	
of	epistemic	risk,	how	they	relate	to	one	another,	and	how	they	might	be	managed.	The	
proceeding	examination	of	epistemic	risks	in	research	on	GM	crops	is	a	step	in	this	direction.	
	 In	the	case	of	GM	crops,	of	course,	the	object	of	evaluation	is	not	a	theory	but	rather	a	
technology.	Still,	there	are	many	who	hold	that	GM	crops	can	be	evaluated	in	a	value-free	
manner,	because	they	believe	that	(1)	there	is	only	one	relevant	evaluative	criterion	for	GM	
crops—e.g.,	health	and	safety—and	(2)	determinations	of	health	and	safety	risks	are	scientific	
matters	that	can	be	decided	in	a	value	free	manner.	I	will	evaluate	each	of	these	claims	in	turn	
and	show	that,	in	both	cases,	there	are	important	epistemic	risks	that	must	be	managed	in	light	
of	values	and	interests	and	that	disagreements	in	the	GMO	debate	often	stem	from	
disagreements	over	these	values.	
	
3.	Is	Health	and	Safety	the	Only	Relevant	Criterion?	A	significant	(and	often	unstated)	point	of	
contention	in	the	GMO	debate	concerns	the	range	of	risks	that	are	relevant	to	the	debate.	
Critics	of	GMOs,	for	example,	tend	to	have	a	broad	range	of	concerns,	including	health	and	
safety	risks	(e.g.,	allergenicity),	risks	to	the	environment	(e.g.,	evolution	of	herbicide	and/or	
pesticide	tolerant	plants	or	animals),	and	legal	and	socio-economic	risks	(e.g.,	accidental	flow	of	
GM	seeds	onto	organic	farms,	heavy-handed	use	of	patent	infringement	lawsuits).10	GMO	
proponents,	on	the	other	hand,	tend	to	adopt	a	much	narrower	conception	of	risk.	Some	
argue—or,	more	commonly,	assume—that	health	and	safety	is	the	only	relevant	criterion	for	
evaluating	GM	crops.11	For	example,	Mark	Lynas,	writing	for	the	Cornell	Alliance	for	Science,	
asserts	that	“the	GMO	debate	is	over,”	supporting	this	statement	by	referencing	a	2016	
National	Academies	report,	which	found	“no	substantiated	evidence	that	foods	from	GE	crops	
were	less	safe	than	foods	from	non-GE	crops”	(Lynas	2016).	On	this	way	of	framing	the	issue,	
                                                
10	See	Hicks	and	Millstein	(2016)	for	a	discussion	of	non-health-and-safety	issues.	
11	For	discussions	of	the	predominance	of	the	health-and-safety	framing,	see	Hicks	(in	press),	
Nestle	(2010),	and	Thompson	(2010).	By	“health	and	safety	risks,”	I	mean	risks	of	direct	harm	
from	consumption	of	GM	crops	by	humans	or	non-target	species	(e.g.,	butterflies).	I	define	
health	and	safety	risks	in	terms	of	direct	harms	from	consumption	to	distinguish	from	cases	of	
indirect	biophysical	harm—for	example,	nutritional	deficiencies	that	result	from	socio-
economic	harms	that	can	be	traced	to	the	spread	of	a	new	technology.	
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the	GMO	debate	is	nothing	more	than	a	debate	over	health	and	safety.	Other	proponents	
maintain	that	the	only	risks	relevant	to	the	debate	are	those	that	are	“inherent	to	genetic	
engineering.”	Saletan	(2015),	for	example,	argues	that	environmental	and	socio-economic	risks	
are	irrelevant	to	the	GMO	debate,	because	they	are	“not…	fundamentally	about	genetic	
engineering.”	On	this	view,	the	only	legitimate	question	that	participants	in	debates	over	GM	
crops	may	ask	is:	Are	there	risks	associated	with	GM	crops	that	are	inherent	to	genetic	
engineering?		
	 Is	it	impermissible	to	evaluate	GMOs	according	to	a	broad	range	of	criteria?	Is	it	
required	that	GMOs	be	evaluated	according	to	a	narrow	conception	of	risks?	I	will	argue	that	it	
is	not,	beginning	by	examining	more	closely	what	it	means	for	a	risk	to	be	inherent	to	genetic	
engineering.	This	question	is	typically	left	unanswered	by	those	who	dismiss	risks	that	
purportedly	fall	outside	of	this	category.	I	take	it	that	if	we	define	risk	in	terms	of	a	probability	
of	harm,	then	a	sufficient	condition	for	a	risk	being	inherent	to	genetic	engineering	is	that	there	
is	some	part	of	the	technological	process	of	genetic	engineering	that	causally	necessitates	an	
increase	in	the	probability	of	that	harm.	Thus,	for	example,	if	the	GM	process	involved	the	use	
of	antibiotic	resistant	genes	as	markers,	and	if	these	genes	raised	the	probability	of	antibiotic	
resistance	in	humans,	then	this	risk	would	be	inherent	to	genetic	engineering,	or	at	least	to	this	
method	of	genetic	engineering.	On	the	other	hand,	socio-economic	risks	resulting	from	the	use	
or	abuse	of	patents	or	patent	licenses	by	seed	companies	would	not	be	risks	inherent	to	genetic	
engineering,	as	there	is	nothing	in	the	GM	process	that	causally	necessitates	the	patenting	of	
GM	crops.		
The	claim	that	the	only	legitimate	criticisms	of	GM	crops	are	those	that	pertain	to	risks	
inherent	to	GM	is	problematic	on	a	number	of	grounds,	but	the	most	important	(and,	to	my	
mind,	the	most	straightforward)	is	that	it	is	legitimate	to	evaluate	technologies	on	the	basis	of	
their	intended	consequences.	If	GM	crops	are	designed	for	particular	uses,	and	if	those	
intended	uses	raise	the	probability	of	harm,	then	it	is	perfectly	legitimate	to	criticize	the	crops	
on	those	grounds—even	if	the	intended	uses	are	not	causally	necessitated	by	the	technological	
process	of	genetic	engineering.12		
Consider,	for	example,	the	risk	that	the	development	and	dissemination	of	some	GM	
crops	will	lead	to	increases	in	patent	infringement	and	breach	of	contract	lawsuits	against	
farmers—and,	more	generally,	to	the	consolidation	of	power	over	agricultural	research,	
products,	and	methods	in	the	hands	of	a	few	multinational	corporations.13	This	is	not	a	risk	
inherent	in	genetic	engineering;	the	process	of	GM	does	not	causally	necessitate	the	patenting	
                                                
12	In	my	view,	actions	can	be	evaluated	not	only	on	the	basis	of	their	intended	consequences,	
but	also	on	the	basis	of	consequences	that	are	either	foreseen	or	foreseeable.	For	the	purposes	
of	this	argument,	however,	I	need	only	the	claim	that	actions	can	be	evaluated	on	the	basis	of	
their	intended	consequences.	The	general	point	that	it	is	legitimate	to	evaluate	GM	crops	on	
the	basis	of	their	foreseen	or	foreseeable	consequences—even	if	those	consequences	are	not	
causally	necessitated	by	the	GM	process—has	been	made	by	a	number	of	others,	including	Lacy	
(2005).	
13	See	Biddle	(2014),	Hicks	and	Millstein	(2016),	Kloppenburg	(2004),	and	Pechlaner	(2012)	for	
discussions	of	patenting	and	licensing	of	GM	seeds.		
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and	licensing	of	crops	by	seed	companies.	But	there	is	no	doubt	that	an	important	reason	why	
companies	develop	GM	crops	is	because	they	can	be	patented	and	licensed	in	ways	that	control	
the	kinds	of	access	that	users	are	legally	permitted	to	have.	Patent	infringement	and	breach	of	
contract	lawsuits	are	intended	consequences	of	the	development	and	dissemination	of	these	
technologies;	GM	crops	were	designed	in	part	for	this	purpose,	and	as	a	result,	it	is	perfectly	
legitimate	to	criticize	them	on	these	grounds.		
One	might	object	to	the	preceding	argument	by	claiming	that,	when	commentators	
criticize	GM	crops,	they	are	attempting	to	argue	that	GM	crops	as	a	class,	or	GM	crops	as	such,	
are	problematic.	As	a	result,	if	their	arguments	are	to	succeed,	they	must	show	that	there	are	
risks	inherent	to	genetic	engineering,	as	showing	that	there	are	other	types	of	risks	(not	
inherent	to	GM)	does	not	establish	that	there	are	risks	of	GM	crops	as	such.	In	response,	this	
objection	might	succeed	against	arguments	directed	to	GM	crops	as	a	class,	but	it	does	not	
succeed	against	criticisms	of	particular	GM	crops	for	the	particular	ways	in	which	they	are	
used—and	there	are	many	criticisms	that	fall	into	this	latter	category.	To	take	just	one	example,	
consider	the	criticism	of	golden	rice	by	the	Southeast	Asia	Regional	Initiatives	for	Community	
Empowerment	(SEARICE),	an	activist	group	based	in	the	Philippines:		
“the	issue	on	GMO	is	not	on	genetic	engineering	per	se,	but	on	how	this	has	been	used	
and	is	being	used	to	wrest	control	and	access	over	the	plant	genetic	resources	on	which	
the	farmers’	over	time	have	been	the	stewards	and	innovators….	(SEARICE	2013,	5,	
emphasis	in	original)	
In	this	criticism,	SEARICE	makes	it	explicit	that	it	is	not	opposed	to	GM	crops	as	such,	but	rather	
to	the	ways	in	which	particular	GM	crops	are	being	used.14	These	kinds	of	criticisms	need	not—
and	often	do	not—result	from	bias,	ignorance,	and/or	dishonesty;	they	are	not	necessarily	anti-
scientific,	and	indeed	are	often	entirely	legitimate.	
	 From	the	preceding	discussion,	we	can	conclude	that	a	narrow	conception	of	risk	is	not	
required;	it	is	perfectly	legitimate	to	evaluate	GM	crops	on	the	basis	of	environmental,	legal,	
and	socio-economic	risks.	The	argument	that	it	is	only	legitimate	to	criticize	GM	crops	on	the	
basis	of	risks	inherent	to	genetic	engineering	does	not	succeed.	It	is	legitimate	to	criticize	GM	
crops,	at	the	very	least,	on	the	basis	of	their	intended	consequences,	and	some	of	these	
consequences	are	legal	and	socio-economic.	From	this,	we	can	conclude	that	it	is	not	the	case	
that	health	and	safety	concerns	are	the	only	legitimate	concerns	that	one	might	have.		
	 This	discussion	also	relates	in	important	ways	to	the	discussions	of	values	in	science	in	
the	previous	section—in	particular	to	Kuhn’s	argument	that	evaluative	criteria	in	science	can	be	
interpreted	and	weighted	differently	with	respect	to	one	another.	Just	as	scientists	adjudicating	
theories	might	legitimately	assign	different	weights	to	different	evaluative	criteria,	so	scientists,	
engineers,	regulators,	policy	makers,	and	others	might	legitimately	assign	different	weights	to	
the	different	kinds	of	risks	associated	with	GM	crops.	There	is	nothing	anti-scientific	about	
emphasizing	environmental,	legal,	socio-economic,	and	other	kinds	of	risks	that	fall	outside	of	
                                                
14	See	Biddle	(2017)	for	a	discussion	of	SEARICE’s	criticisms	of	golden	rice	and,	more	generally,	
an	argument	against	evaluating	GM	crops	as	a	class.		
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the	health	and	safety	category.	How	one	weighs	the	importance	of	different	types	of	concerns	
is	ultimately	a	question	of	values.		
	
3.1.	Framing	Risks	as	a	Type	of	Epistemic	Risk	
Different	ways	of	framing	the	problem	of	GM	crops	involve	epistemic	risk.	To	see	this,	
let	me	first	make	a	few	terminological	notes.	While	the	term	‘frame’	is	used	in	many	ways,	I	use	
it	here	to	mean	an	implicit	or	explicit	characterization	of	a	problem,	including	(among	other	
things)	a	specification	of	bounds	of	the	problem—what	falls	under	its	scope	and	what	falls	
outside	of	it.15	By	‘ethical	risk,’	I	mean	risk	of	harm	in	the	broadest	sense,	and	by	‘epistemic	
risk,’	I	mean	risk	of	error	in	the	broadest	sense.	The	concepts	of	ethical	risk	and	epistemic	risk,	
and	their	relations	to	one	another,	are	discussed	more	fully	in	Biddle	and	Kukla	(2017).	The	use	
of	GM	crops	poses	various	ethical	risks—including	health	and	safety	risks,	environmental	risks,	
and	socio-economic	risks—and	including	(or	excluding)	any	of	these	risks	in	a	characterization	
of	the	problem	of	GM	crops	amounts	to	different	ways	of	framing	the	problem.	As	we	have	
seen,	many	commentators	frame	it	narrowly,	including	only	health	and	safety	risks.	This	way	of	
framing	the	problem	involves	epistemic	risk	in	a	very	straightforward	way—it	can	inhibit	
investigations	of	other	risks,	which	in	turn	can	lead	to	selective	ignorance	or	error.16	In	
particular,	it	can	lead	to	the	failure	to	accept	significant	truths	that	would	have	otherwise	been	
accepted,	had	those	questions	been	investigated	more	fully.17	More	generally,	framing	a	
problem	in	any	way	will	affect	decisions	about	which	sorts	of	evidence	is	relevant	to	that	
problem;	these	decisions	will	impact	the	distribution	of	investigative	resources,	which	in	turn	
will	impact	the	ways	in	which	those	investigations	balance	the	risks	of	false	positives,	false	
negatives,	and	failure	to	generate	results	at	all.	
The	tendency	to	frame	the	problem	solely	in	terms	of	health	and	safety	likely	
contributes	to	selective	ignorance	of	non-health-and-safety	risks.	Consider,	for	example,	the	
effects	of	patents	and	patent	licenses	on	GM	crop	research.	All	GM	crops	are	patented,	and	
standard	patent	licenses	prohibit	others	from	researching	those	crops.	According	to	standard	
Monsanto	license	agreements,	a	grower	“may	not	plant	and	may	not	transfer	to	others	for	
planting	any	Seed	that	the	grower	has	produced	containing	patented	Monsanto	Technologies	
                                                
15	See	Hoffmann	(2011)	for	a	discussion	of	framing	in	the	context	of	conflict	management.	
Hoffmann	distinguishes	broadly	between	‘semiotic	framing’	and	‘cognitive	framing,’	where	the	
former	is	the	process	of	producing	signs	and	the	latter	the	process	of	interpreting	signs.	He	
further	distinguishes	between	two	types	of	semiotic	framing:	‘boundary	setting,’	which	
indicates	what	falls	under	an	issue	and	what	doesn’t,	and	‘meaning	construction,’	which	
indicates	the	meanings	of	the	things	that	fall	under	the	issue.	I	use	the	term	framing	primarily	in	
the	sense	of	boundary	setting,	though	as	Hoffmann	argues,	boundary	setting	is	intertwined	
with	cognitive	framing,	as	how	one	defines	a	problem	is	related	to	how	one	interprets,	or	
‘makes	sense’	of,	that	problem.		
16	The	term	“selective	ignorance”	is	due	to	Elliott	(2012),	and	the	concept	of	selective	ignorance	
comes	from	Proctor's	introduction	to	Proctor	and	Schiebinger	(2008).	
17	The	concept	of	significant	truth	is	developed	by	Kitcher	(2001).		
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for	crop	breeding,	research,	or	generation	of	herbicide	registration	data”	(Monsanto	Company	
2008,	emphasis	added).	Other	seed	companies	have	similar	restrictions	(Scientific	American	
2009).	In	2009,	a	group	of	entomologists	from	public	U.S.	universities	issued	a	statement	that	
license	restrictions	were	“inhibiting	public	scientists	from	pursuing	their	mandated	role	on	
behalf	of	the	public	good	unless	the	research	is	approved	by	industry.”	As	a	result	of	these	
restrictions,	they	argued,	“no	truly	independent	research	can	be	legally	conducted	on	many	
critical	questions	regarding	the	technology….”18	Since	then,	some	patchwork	agreements	have	
loosened	restrictions,	but	patent	licenses	still	place	significant	impediments	to	research	for	
many	scientists	(Biddle	2014;	Glenna	et	al.	2015;	Hicks	and	Millstein	2016).	These	impediments	
raise	a	series	of	important	questions,	such	as:	Have	patent	licenses	on	GM	crops	impacted	
research	activity?	If	so,	how?	And	to	what	extent?	These	are	questions	that	are	amenable	to	
empirical	investigation,	and	yet	they	have	received	very	little	attention.19	A	plausible	
explanation	for	this	lack	of	attention	is	that,	on	a	narrow	health	and	safety	framing,	evidence	
about	the	effects	of	patent	licenses	on	research	is	simply	not	relevant	to	the	GMO	debate.	The	
incentive	to	investigate	these	questions	is	greatly	reduced	on	a	narrow	health	and	safety	
framing,	and	given	these	reduced	incentives,	risks	of	ignorance	or	error	is	increased.20	
Framing	is	a	necessary	activity—the	investigation	of	a	problem	requires	that	the	
problem	be	defined	and	delimited—and	the	fact	that	framing	involves	epistemic	risk	has	not	
been	emphasized	in	discussions	of	the	role	of	values	in	science21	or	the	GMO	debate.22	Perhaps	
one	explanation	for	why	philosophers	of	science	have	not	emphasized	this	stems	from	the	
                                                
18	The	comment	can	be	found	at:	http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=EPA-HQ-
OPP-2008-0835-0017.	Accessed	April	20,	2017.	
19	To	my	knowledge,	Glenna	et	al.	(2015)	is	the	only	empirical	study	of	questions	like	this.	They	
surveyed	entomologists	who	conduct	research	on	GM	crops;	while	their	study	is	limited,	they	
do	find	some	evidence	for	concern—such	as	that	31%	of	respondents	report	that	their	research	
on	GM	crop	efficacy	or	environmental	impact	has	been	“hindered	by	an	industry	partner”	
(Glenna	et	al.	2015,	161).	However,	further	investigations	are	required	to	get	a	clearer	picture	
of	the	impact	of	patents	and	patent	licenses	on	GM	crop	research.		
20	For	investigators	who	initially	assume	that	patent	licenses	do	not	restrict	research	activity,	
the	failure	to	investigate	this	question	might	contribute	to	false	negatives.	For	those	who	have	
never	considered	the	question	in	the	first	place,	it	contributes	to	continued	ignorance.		
21	Some	have	argued	for	a	related	claim,	namely	that	the	choice	of	problems	to	address	can	
affect	decisions	of	which	hypotheses	to	accept,	as	prior	decisions	about	which	projects	to	
pursue	affects	the	data	sets	available	at	a	given	time,	as	well	as	the	space	of	potential	solutions	
that	a	scientist	might	consider.	Okruhlik	(1994)	and	Elliott	and	McKaughan	(2009)	given	
arguments	similar	to	this.	The	point	that	I	am	making	here	is	related	but	different.	I	agree	that	
decisions	to	investigate	one	set	of	problems	rather	than	another	involves	epistemic	risk,	but	I	
am	also	arguing	that	the	way	in	which	a	problem	is	framed	in	the	first	place	involves	epistemic	
risk.	
22	Several	commentators	on	the	GMO	debate	have	emphasized	the	consequences	of	a	narrow	
health-and-safety	framing	on	ethics,	politics,	and	regulation	(e.g.,	Hicks	in	press;	Nestle	2010;	
Thompson	2010),	but	none	to	my	knowledge	has	emphasize	the	consequences	for	research.		
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expanded	account	of	inductive	risk.	On	this	expanded	account,	there	is	a	tendency	to	view	all	
relevant	risks	internal	to	scientific	research	as	inductive	risks.	But	the	risk	involved	in	framing	a	
problem	is	clearly	not	an	inductive	risk.	While	the	differences	between	the	two	merit	further	
exploration,	one	clear	difference	is	that	inductive	risk	is	necessarily	a	type	of	inferential	risk,	
whereas	framing	risk	is	not.	To	frame	a	problem	in	a	particular	way	is	not	(necessarily)	to	
develop	a	hypothesis	about	how	it	should	be	framed	and	then	accept	(or	reject)	that	hypothesis	
on	the	basis	of	evidence.	There	are	a	variety	of	factors	that	might	lead	a	researcher	to	frame	a	
problem	in	a	particular	way;	in	many	cases,	framing	occurs	unconsciously,	without	
consideration	of	evidence	at	all.	Despite	the	fact	that	framing	risk	is	distinct	from	inductive	risk,	
framing	does	involve	epistemic	risk,	in	that	it	involves	tradeoffs	between	risks	of	false	positives,	
false	negatives,	and	failure	to	obtain	results.	The	tendency	to	view	all	relevant	risks	as	inductive	
risks	might,	in	cases	such	as	this,	serve	to	mask	important	epistemic	risks	that	are	distinct	from	
inductive	risk.		
That	framing	involves	epistemic	risk	is	a	point	that	deserves	to	be	made,	particularly	
given	how	important	framing	is	in	the	debate	over	GM	crops	(as	well	as	in	other	debates).	One	
of	the	points	at	issue	in	this	debate	is	which	questions	legitimately	fall	under	the	umbrella	of	
the	GMO	debate;	given	the	importance	of	boundary	work	in	this	debate,	it	is	important	to	
emphasize	that	framing	not	only	has	implications	for	ethics	and	politics,	but	also	for	
epistemology.	This	latter	claim	has	not	been	emphasized	in	philosophical	discussions	of	the	role	
of	value	in	science.		
	
4.	On	Determining	Safety	Value	Free.	Suppose	that	we	put	aside	the	issue	of	how	narrowly	or	
broadly	to	frame	the	GMO	problem	and	focus	exclusively	on	health	and	safety	risks.	Many	
argue	that	the	determination	of	health	and	safety	risks	can	and	should	be	done	in	a	value	
neutral	manner.	For	example,	the	United	Nations	Food	and	Agriculture	Organization’s	“Science	
for	Safe	Food”	strategy	demands	that	scientific	advice	on	food	safety	be	based	on	“sound	
science”	that	is	“neutral	and	independent.”23	Furthermore,	many	hold	that	such	neutral	and	
independent	research	has	already	been	conducted,	and	that	the	result	is	that	GM	crops	(at	
least	those	that	are	currently	sold	on	the	market)	are	at	least	as	safe	as	those	produced	using	
traditional	methods	(e.g.,	Blancke	et	al.	2015;	Bourlaug	2000).	A	closer	examination	of	the	
question	of	health	and	safety	risks,	however,	shows	that	there	are	still	significant	spaces	for	
rational	disagreement,	and	value	judgments	play	an	important	role	in	explaining	disagreement	
within	these	spaces.		
It	is	reflective	of	the	polarized	nature	of	the	debate	that,	not	only	do	published	studies	
on	health	and	safety	impacts	of	GM	crops	arrive	at	different	conclusions,	but	so	also	do	
systematic	reviews	of	those	studies.	According	to	one	review,	“the	studies	reviewed	present	
evidence	to	show	that	GM	plants	are	nutritionally	equivalent	to	their	non-GM	counterparts	and	
can	be	safely	used	in	food	and	feed”	(Snell	et	al.	2012,	1134).	Another	review,	however,	finds	
that	the	number	of	research	groups	finding	significant	health	and	safety	risks	is	roughly	equal	to	
                                                
23	See,	for	example:	<http://www.fao.org/3/a-i2797e/i2797e06.pdf>.	Accessed	November	19,	
2017.		
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the	number	indicating	no	such	risks	(Domingo	and	Bordonaba	2011).	Yet	another	concludes	
that	the	overall	results	are	inconclusive:		
it	appears	that	there	is	no	adverse	effect	of	GM	crops	observed	for	many	species	of	
animal	in	acute	or	short-term	feeding	studies,	but	serious	debate	still	surrounds	long-
term	and	multigenerational	feeding	studies….	Therefore,	long-term	and	
multigenerational	feeding	studies	are	clearly	necessary	to	further	investigate	on	this	
important	issue	(Zhang	and	Shi	2011,	1056).		
More	generally,	Krimsky	(2015)	searched	PubMed	and	Web	of	Science	databases	for	systematic	
reviews	on	health-and-safety	impacts	of	GMOs	between	2008	and	2014;	eight	reviews	were	
published	during	this	period,	and	they	differ	significantly	in	their	conclusions.	There	are	
systematic	reviews	that	fit	into	the	following	three	categories:	(1)	those	that	find	evidence	for	
significant	health	and	safety	risks,	(2)	those	that	find	no	evidence	for	significant	health	and	
safety	risks,	and	(3)	those	that	come	to	no	general	conclusion	but	call	for	more	testing.		
How	can	systematic	reviews	of	scientific	articles	arrive	at	such	diverse	conclusions?	
There	are	a	variety	of	factors	that	help	to	explain	this	diversity,	including	different	choices	of	
endpoints	(e.g.,	Snell	et	al.	investigate	health	impact	generally,	whereas	Zhang	and	Shi	focus	on	
animal	reproduction),	determinations	of	which	studies	to	include	in	the	review,	and	weightings	
of	the	importance	of	these	studies.	However,	one	of	the	most	important	sources	of	controversy	
regarding	health	and	safety	risks	concerns	the	question	of	how	long	animal	studies	need	to	be	
in	order	detect	chronic,	long-term	risks.	The	current	standard	is	90-day	feeding	studies	in	
rodents;	this	standard	has	been	adopted	by	a	number	of	scientific	and	regulatory	bodies,	
including	the	European	Food	Safety	Authority	(EFSA)	(DeFrancesco	2013).	By	and	large,	these	
studies	have	not	found	significant	health-and-safety	risks	resulting	from	consumption	of	GMOs.	
At	the	same	time,	the	90-day	standard	is	a	convention,	and	it	is	unclear	whether	the	convention	
is	well-suited	for	obtaining	results	that	bear	on	long-term	human	health.	According	to	Martijn	
Katan,	emeritus	professor	of	nutrition	at	Vrije	Universiteit	Amsterdam,	“few	toxicologists	ever	
stop	to	think	whether	such	[90-day]	animal	tests	really	predict	the	effect	in	humans,	because	if	
we	start	to	doubt	this	dogma,	the	whole	system	collapses”	(quoted	in	DeFrancesco	2013,	797).	
The	European	Union	has	called	for	two-year	carcinogenicity	studies	(DeFrancesco	2013,	797),	
and	a	number	of	scientists	who	investigate	health	and	safety	risks	in	GMOs	have	recommended	
that	more	long-term	studies	be	conducted	(e.g.,	Zhang	and	Shi	2011).		
One	of	the	studies	at	the	center	of	this	debate	is	a	controversial	article	by	Séralini	et	al.	
(2012)	that	was	later	retracted.	Noting	that	long-term	studies	on	animals	had	not	been	
conducted,	Séralini	et	al.	examined	the	effects	of	consumption	of	Roundup-tolerant	GM	maize	
(including	maize	cultivated	with	and	without	Roundup)	on	rats	over	a	2-year	period,	which	is	
roughly	the	lifespan	of	the	rats.	The	results	of	the	investigation	included	higher	incidence	of	
mortality	(2-3	fold)	in	the	treated	groups,	more	rapid	morality,	and	higher	numbers	of	tumors.	
The	study	included	10	rats	in	each	group,	which	is	below	the	standard	for	carcinogenesis	
studies	(50/group).	However,	the	authors	stated	explicitly	that	their	study	was	not	intended	to	
test	for	carcinogenicity	(Séralini	et	al.	2012,	4222).	Perhaps	most	importantly,	Séralini	et	al.	
hoped	this	preliminary	study	would	shed	light	on	the	question	of	whether	larger,	long-term	
studies	on	GM	crops	should	be	conducted	regularly.		
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Immediately	after	publication	of	the	paper	in	Food	and	Chemical	Toxicology	(FCT),	the	
journal	was	flooded	with	criticisms	and	demands	that	the	paper	be	retracted.	After	an	
extended	debate—including	a	point-by-point	response	to	criticisms	by	Séralini	et	al.	and	an	
editorial	by	the	journal’s	editor-in-chief	that	appear	to	back	the	original	article—the	editor-in-
chief	retracted	the	paper.24	However,	the	editor-in-chief	was	explicit	and	unequivocal	that	
there	was	“no	evidence	of	fraud	or	intentional	misrepresentation	of	the	data….	Ultimately,	the	
results	presented	(while	not	incorrect)	are	inconclusive.”25	The	decision	to	retract	the	paper	is	
controversial.	The	“inconclusiveness”	of	a	paper	is	not	typically	regarded	as	grounds	for	
retraction;	for	example,	the	Committee	on	Publication	Ethics	does	not	consider	this	to	be	
sufficient	grounds	for	retraction	(COPE	2009).26	Moreover,	the	data	presented	in	the	paper	was	
not	called	into	question	by	the	editor-in-chief,	and	the	data	is	arguably	very	valuable,	as	it	
constitutes	strong	grounds	for	the	claim	that	larger,	long-term	studies	should	be	conducted.	As	
it	stands,	the	data	is	not	only	ignored	by	many	GMO	proponents;	the	retraction	is	also	used	as	a	
rhetorical	weapon	to	suggest	that	the	only	way	to	question	the	safety	of	GM	foods	is	to	
manufacture	data.	
Upon	examination	of	the	divergence	in	conclusions	reached	by	the	various	systematic	
reviews	of	health	and	safety	risks,	it	is	clear	that	there	is	still	significant	disagreement	among	
the	relevant	experts	in	the	field.	The	question	of	how	long	animal	studies	need	to	be	in	order	to	
assess	long-term	risks	is	not,	at	this	point,	answerable	conclusively	by	the	available	evidence.	
Answers	to	this	question	depend	on	value	judgments	concerning	the	balancing	of	false	
positives,	false	negatives,	and	failure	to	generate	results.	There	is	nothing	irrational	or	anti-
scientific	in	arguing	that	two-year	studies	should	be	conducted.		
	
4.1.	Power	Risks	as	a	Type	of	Epistemic	Risk	
There	are	epistemic	risks	in	research	on	health-and-safety	impacts	of	GMOs,	and	it	
might	appear	at	first	glance	that—in	the	case	of	the	question	of	how	long	the	animal	studies	
should	be—the	relevant	epistemic	risks	are	inductive	risks.	On	further	examination,	however,	
the	situation	is	more	complex.		
Torsten	Wilholt	has	shown	that	scientific	reasoning	involves	complex	tradeoffs	between	
the	reliability	of	positive	results	(or	risks	of	false	positives),	the	reliability	of	negative	results	(or	
risks	of	false	negatives),	and	the	investigation’s	power,	which	he	defines	as	the	rate	at	which	an	
investigation	delivers	definitive	results	(Wilholt	2013,	244).	In	undertaking	scientific	
                                                
24	See	Krimsky	(2015)	for	further	discussion.	
25	http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0278691512005637.	Accessed	November	
19,	2017.		
26	COPE	guidelines	are	that	editors	should	consider	retraction	if	one	of	the	following	four	
conditions	are	met:	“they	have	clear	evidence	that	the	findings	are	unreliable,	either	as	a	result	
of	misconduct…	or	honest	error…;	the	findings	have	previously	been	published	elsewhere,	
without	proper	crossreferencing,	permission,	or	justification…;	it	constitutes	plagiarism;	it	
reports	unethical	research”	(COPE	2009,	also	quoted	in	Krimsky	2015).	As	acknowledged	by	the	
FCT	editor-in-chief,	Séralini	et	al.	(2012)	satisfies	none	of	these	conditions.	
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investigations,	we	wish	not	only	to	avoid	wrongly	accepting	false	hypotheses	and	wrongly	
rejecting	true	hypotheses—we	also	wish	to	generate	results.	For	example,	in	choosing	levels	of	
statistical	significance,	researchers	who	wish	to	avoid	false	positives	must	at	the	same	time	
ensure	that	they	do	not	set	their	p	values	too	low,	as	this	might	raise	to	unacceptable	levels	the	
risks	of	false	negatives	and/or	of	failure	to	generate	results	at	all.	If	an	investigator	set	p	equal	
to	0.005	(ten	times	lower	than	the	conventional	standard),	and	if	the	investigation	failed	to	
yield	a	statistically	significant	association,	the	investigator	might	conclude	that	there	is	no	such	
association—or	they	might	not	conclude	anything	at	all	and	remain	in	a	state	of	ignorance.	
Scientific	reasoning	requires	balancing	the	reliability	of	positive	results,	reliability	of	negative	
results,	and	an	investigation’s	power—and	under	most	circumstances,	this	balancing	is	done	in	
light	of	values	and	interests	(Wilholt	2009;	2013).	Given	this	background,	one	might	distinguish	
between	inductive	risk	(the	risk	of	wrongly	accepting	or	rejecting	a	hypothesis	on	the	basis	of	
evidence)	and	power	risk	(the	risk	that	an	investigation	does	not	generate	results	at	all).		
As	an	example,	consider	the	standard	90-day	toxicology	studies	on	rodents,	and	
suppose	for	the	sake	of	argument	that	the	studies	involve	a	sufficiently	high	number	of	animals	
(whatever	‘sufficiently	high’	is,	in	this	case).	The	reliability	of	positive	results	and	the	reliability	
of	negative	results	will	be	impacted	by	the	choice	of	a	p	value;	lower	p	values	will	increase	the	
reliability	of	positive	results	and	decrease	the	reliability	of	negative	results,	while	higher	p	
values	will	do	the	opposite.	But	the	debate	over	trial	lengths	suggests	that	there	is	also	
significant	power	risk	involved	in	these	trials.	There	are	many	experts	within	the	relevant	field	
who	interpret	negative	results	not	as	indicating	that	GMOs	have	no	significant	detrimental	
long-term	health	impacts	in	rodents,	but	as	indicating	nothing	whatsoever	about	long-term	
risks.	They	remain	in	a	state	of	ignorance,	because	they	do	not	believe	that	90-day	trials	are	
powerful	enough	(in	this	case,	long	enough)	to	detect	chronic	long-term	health	risks.	In	order	
for	a	trial	to	be	sufficiently	powerful	to	generate	results	about	a	particular	hypothesis,	the	trial	
must	produce	enough	evidence,	and	it	must	produce	evidence	of	the	right	sort—that	is,	
evidence	that	is	relevant	to	the	hypothesis	in	question.	In	this	case,	there	is	significant	
disagreement	among	the	relevant	experts	about	whether	90-day	trials	produce	evidence	that	is	
relevant	to	long-term	health	risks	in	humans.	(There	might	also	be	questions	about	whether	
evidence	from	animal	studies	provide	evidence	relevant	to	health	risks	in	humans,	but	I	will	not	
consider	that	issue	here.)	Thus,	90-day	trials	involve	significant	power	risk	of	failing	to	generate	
results	that	are	relevant	to	long-term	health	risks,	and	this	risk	can	and	often	should	be	
distinguished	from	other	types	of	epistemic	risk.		
The	importance	of	distinguishing	between	reliability	of	positive	results,	reliability	of	
negative	results,	and	power	is	also	evident	from	the	divergent	conclusions	reached	by	
systematic	reviews	of	research	on	health	and	safety	risks	of	GM	foods.	Recall	that	the	reviews	
fit	into	the	following	three	categories:	(1)	those	that	find	evidence	for	significant	health	and	
safety	risks	(positive	result),	(2)	those	that	find	no	evidence	for	significant	health	and	safety	
risks	(negative	result),	and	(3)	those	that	come	to	no	general	conclusion	but	call	for	more	
testing	(no	result).	Researchers	must	make	tradeoffs	between	risks	of	false	positives,	false	
negatives,	and	failure	to	generate	results,	and	these	tradeoffs	reflect	value	judgments	about	
the	costs	of	different	types	of	error	for	different	stakeholders.	Given	that	these	value	
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judgments	can	plausibly	be	made	in	different	ways,	there	is	space	for	rational	disagreement	in	
the	assessment	of	health	and	safety	risks	of	GM	crops.	
	
5.	Conclusions:	Values,	Epistemic	Risks,	and	Varieties	of	Disagreement.	I	have	argued	that	
criticisms	of	GM	crops	are	not	necessarily	“anti-science.”	There	are	significant	spaces	for	
rational	disagreement	in	evaluations	of	the	risks	of	GM	crops,	and	differences	in	values	play	
important	roles	within	these	spaces.	There	are	a	number	of	reasons	why	it	is	important	to	
recognize	this.	First,	the	GMO	debate	has	important	implications	for	public	policy	making,	
agricultural	practice,	health	and	environmental	impact,	and	many	other	areas.	The	technology	
of	genetic	engineering	is	promising,	and	it	could	lead	to	important	agricultural	developments,	
especially	given	the	growing	challenges	of	adapting	to	global	climate	change.	At	the	same	time,	
many	GM	crops	impose	significant	risks	upon	farmers	and	other	members	of	the	public;	some	
of	these	might	be	health	and	safety	risks,	but	many	are	legal,	socio-economic,	and	otherwise	
outside	of	a	narrow	health-and-safety	framework.	Given	the	importance	of	the	GMO	debate	for	
multiple	stakeholders,	it	is	crucial	that	the	debate	be	conducted	in	an	intelligent	fashion,	and	
recognition	of	the	roles	and	impacts	of	values	and	interest	in	GMO	research	could	help	to	
improve	the	character	and	quality	of	the	debate.		
There	is	a	tendency	on	both	sides	of	the	debate	to	interpret	the	controversy	in	terms	of	
what	one	might	call	dirty	disagreement.	By	dirty	disagreement,	I	mean	disagreement	that	
results	from	ignorance,	bias,	irrationality,	or	dishonesty	on	the	part	of	one	or	more	parties	to	
the	disagreement.	Dirty	disagreement	is	not	rational	disagreement;	in	this	case,	at	least	one	
party	to	the	disagreement	argues	dishonestly	or	makes	a	mistake	(for	example,	by	ignoring	
relevant	evidence	or	committing	inferential	errors).	There	are	many	within	the	GMO	debate	
who	interpret	the	controversy	in	these	terms—that	is,	they	believe	that	those	who	disagree	
with	them	do	so	as	a	result	of	ignorance,	bias,	irrationality,	or	dishonesty.	There	are	some	
disagreements	that	are	accurately	characterized	in	these	terms.	There	are	even	some	particular	
disagreements	within	the	GMO	debate	that	are	accurately	characterized	in	these	terms.	But	as	
argued,	the	overall	debate	is	not	accurately	characterized	as	such,	as	there	are	significant	
spaces	within	debate	for	rational	disagreement.		
The	GMO	controversy	is	more	accurately	characterized	in	terms	of	deep	disagreement.	
Lynch	(2010)	defines	deep	disagreement	in	terms	of	disagreement	over	which	methods	are	
most	reliable	in	a	given	domain	(where	reliability	is	understood	in	terms	of	production	of	true	
beliefs).	As	the	preceding	discussion	shows,	however,	there	can	be	more	to	deep	disagreement	
than	this.	Deep	disagreement	can	involve	disagreement	about	what	kinds	of	evidence	are	
relevant	to	a	given	hypothesis,	and	while	disagreements	over	what	counts	as	evidence	can	
sometimes	result	from	disagreements	over	methods,	they	can	also	result	from	other	sorts	of	
disagreements.	As	in	the	case	of	the	GMO	debate,	disagreement	over	how	a	problem	should	be	
framed	can	lead	to	disagreement	about	what	kinds	of	evidence	is	relevant	to	that	problem.	
Furthermore,	the	distinction	between	reliability	and	power	shows	that	there	can	be	rational	
disagreement	not	only	over	which	methods	are	most	reliable,	but	also	about	whether	a	
particular	method	produces	evidence	that	is	relevant	to	a	given	hypothesis.	This	suggests	a	
broader	characterization	of	deep	disagreement—one	that	includes	not	only	disagreements	over	
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which	epistemic	standards	are	most	reliable,	but	also	about	which	types	of	evidence	count	as	
evidence	for	a	given	hypothesis.27		
The	notion	of	deep	disagreement—particularly	as	it	relates	to	controversies	in	science	
and	technology—requires	further	investigation,	and	the	question	of	how	differences	in	values	
affect	deep	disagreement	is	of	crucial	importance.	But	in	addition	to	developing	a	more	
sophisticated	philosophical	account	of	deep	disagreement,	it	is	also	important	that	
philosophers	of	science,	scholars	of	science	and	technology	studies,	and	others	contribute	to	
controversies	in	science	and	technology	by	emphasizing	that	rational	disagreement	is	not	only	
possible,	but	pervasive.	Doing	this	could	help	significantly	to	improve	communication	and	raise	
mutual	understanding.		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
                                                
27	Hicks	(2015)	discusses	deep	disagreement	in	terms	of	disagreement	over	what	counts	as	
evidence.		
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